Suspicious Guest Account Privilege Escalation (via process_creation)

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
- T1078.001Default Accounts
Execution
Persistence
- T1078.001Default Accounts
- T1098Account Manipulation
Priv Esc
- T1078.001Default Accounts
- T1098Account Manipulation
Defense Evasion
- T1078.001Default Accounts
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the built-in guest account being added to the local Administrators group. The SLOW#TEMPEST campaign re-enabled the guest account and elevated it to maintain covert privileged access.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1098 — drag to rearrange

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Suspicious Guest Account Privilege Escalation (via process_creation)

Pivot detection · T1098 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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