Suspicious HealthApp Batch File Persistence in Start Menu Startup Folder

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Priv Esc
- T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of a batch file named after the HealthApp masquerade inside the Start Menu Programs startup folder. The Maverick banking Trojan established persistence by dropping a HealthApp-[GUID].bat file into the user startup location so it re-executes at logon. A batch script placed in the startup folder is a classic autostart persistence mechanism abused to survive reboots.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1547.001 — drag to rearrange

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Suspicious OCEANMAP EdgeContext.url Startup Persistence (via file_event)

Suspicious HealthApp Batch File Persistence in Start Menu Startup Folder

Pivot detection · T1547.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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