Suspicious IAM Access Key Creation for Persistence (via cloudtrail)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
aws
Service
cloudtrail
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-05
Updated
2026-09-05

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of a new IAM access key, a cloud account-manipulation technique attackers use to establish durable programmatic access to an AWS account after compromising a principal. Adding access keys for persistence is tracked in the Red Canary Threat Detection Report cloud coverage. Detecting the CreateAccessKey call surfaces a potential backdoor credential being minted.

Related detections9 linkedT1098.001 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious AWS Administrator Policy Attachment via CloudTrail (via aws)
Suspicious AWS Inline Policy Granting Full S3 Access
Suspicious GCP Service Account Key Creation for Persistence (via gcp.audit)
Malicious Credential Added to an Azure AD Application (via auditlogs)
Suspicious AWS Long-Term Access Key Creation for Persistence via CloudTrail (via aws)
Suspicious Credential Added to Existing Application for OAuth Persistence in Entra ID (via azure auditlogs)
Suspicious IAM Policy Attachment Granting AdministratorAccess
Suspicious Credential Added to Application or Service Principal in Entra ID (via azure)
Okta System Log: New Identity Provider Created via system.idp.lifecycle.create
Suspicious IAM Access Key Creation for Persistence (via cloudtrail)
Pivot detection · T1098.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.