Suspicious IAM AdministratorAccess Policy Attachment via CloudTrail (via cloudtrail)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
aws
Service
cloudtrail
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-19
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the Shai Hulud privilege escalation in AWS where a freshly created IAM user is granted the AdministratorAccess managed policy through an AttachUserPolicy call. Attaching full administrator rights to a user is a high impact action that is rare in normal operations. It followed the creation of a cloudops-monitor identity.

Related detections9 linkedT1098 — drag to rearrange
Malicious Cluster-Admin Role Binding Creation (via audit)
Malicious User Password Change Using Current Hash Password - ChangeNTLM - Mimikatz (via security)
Suspicious Account Password Set to Never Expire. (via security)
Malicious Modification of a Computer Account SPN (via security)
Suspicious Massive Group Membership Changes (via security)
Malicious High Risk Active Directory Group Membership Change (via security)
Malicious Account Marked as Sensitive and Cannot Be Delegated Had Its Protection Removed (via security)
Malicious Host Constrained Delegation Settings Changed for Potential Abuse (Rubeus) - Kerberos Only (via security)
Malicious Host Set with Unconstrained Delegation (via security)
Suspicious IAM AdministratorAccess Policy Attachment via CloudTrail (via cloudtrail)
Pivot detection · T1098 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.