Suspicious IAM CreateLoginProfile For Root User via AWS AssumeRoot Abuse

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
aws
Service
cloudtrail
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-20
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Execution

  4. Cred Access

  5. Discovery

  6. Lateral Movement

  7. Collection

  8. C2

  9. Exfiltration

  10. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects an IAM CreateLoginProfile event that establishes console access for the root user which follows abuse of STS AssumeRoot to plant durable access in a member account. Adversaries create a root login profile to convert temporary root credentials into persistent account takeover.

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Suspicious IAM CreateLoginProfile For Root User via AWS AssumeRoot Abuse
Pivot detection · T1078.004 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.