Suspicious Java Runtime Execution from LocalAppData Staging Folder

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
- T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects javaw executing from a user LocalAppData staging directory used by the Xeno stealer. The malware bundles a private Java runtime under Java and Microsoft GameDVR paths to run its malicious JAR while blending in with normal directories.

Reporting behind it

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Suspicious Java Runtime Execution from LocalAppData Staging Folder

Pivot detection · T1036.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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