Suspicious KANDYKORN Python Loader Execution via Process Creation

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
macos
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-17
Updated
2026-09-17

ATT&CK techniques

Execution
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of the Watcher and testSpeed Python scripts used in the DPRK KANDYKORN macOS intrusion to bootstrap the malware. These distinctively named loader scripts are run through the Python interpreter to fetch and stage later stages of the implant.

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Pivot detection · T1059.006 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.