Suspicious Kerberoasting LDAP Search Filter for Service Principal Names

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Service
security
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-01
Updated
2026-10-01

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access → Discovery
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Directory Service search event 1644 whose LDAP filter enumerates all accounts with a servicePrincipalName set, matching Impacket GetUserSPNs reconnaissance for Kerberoasting. Adversaries list SPN-bearing service accounts to request tickets whose hashes can be cracked offline. Broad servicePrincipalName wildcard queries warrant review when not tied to known administrative tooling.

Related detections9 linkedT1069.002 — drag to rearrange
AdFind Discovery
Malicious Kerberoast Ticket Request (via security)
SPN Enumeration Previous to Kerberoasting Attack - PowerShell (via powershell)
Suspicious Massive SAM Users/groups Enumeration - Native (via security)
Suspicious Domain Group Enumeration via SharpSploit Get-DomainGroup
Malicious Kerberoasting or AS-REP Roasting via Rubeus
Suspicious PowerView In-Memory Domain Reconnaissance via Local DownloadString and Invoke-FindLocalAdminAccess (via ps_script)
Suspicious Exchange Trusted Subsystem Group Enumeration via net
Suspicious Active Directory Reconnaissance Commands (via process_creation)
Suspicious Kerberoasting LDAP Search Filter for Service Principal Names
Pivot detection · T1069.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.