Suspicious Kerberoasting LDAP Search Filter for Service Principal Names

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access → Discovery

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
- T1558.003Kerberoasting
Discovery
- T1069.002Domain Groups
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Directory Service search event 1644 whose LDAP filter enumerates all accounts with a servicePrincipalName set, matching Impacket GetUserSPNs reconnaissance for Kerberoasting. Adversaries list SPN-bearing service accounts to request tickets whose hashes can be cracked offline. Broad servicePrincipalName wildcard queries warrant review when not tied to known administrative tooling.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1069.002 — drag to rearrange

Suspicious SOAPHound Style LDAP Query with SDflags and all_with_list via security

Suspicious SOAPHound Null Filter LDAP Query via security

Suspicious SharpHound Group Enumeration LDAP Filter

Suspicious LDAP Security Descriptor Enumeration via SD_FLAGS Control

Suspicious LDAP Query Enumerating Kerberos Preauth Disabled Accounts with Whitespace Evasion

Suspicious Delegation Discovery LDAP Search Filter via Bitwise OID

Suspicious Service Principal Name Discovery via setspn Query

Suspicious Kerberoasting via RC4 Service Ticket Request for MSSQLSvc SPN (via security)

Malicious Active Directory Enumeration via SharpHound or BloodHound (via process_creation)

Suspicious Kerberoasting LDAP Search Filter for Service Principal Names

Pivot detection · T1069.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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