Suspicious Kernel Extension Load on macOS (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
macos
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-03
Updated
2026-09-03

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects kextload, kextutil or kmutil loading a kernel extension, a technique that can install a persistent, high-privilege driver on macOS and is abused by rootkits and stalkerware. Kernel extension abuse is tracked in the Red Canary Threat Detection Report macOS coverage. Detecting the load surfaces kernel-level code being introduced.

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Pivot detection · T1547.006 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.