Suspicious Kubernetes Enumeration via kubectl in Cloud Compromise

ATT&CK techniques

Discovery

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
- T1613Container and Resource Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects cluster-wide pod enumeration via kubectl across all namespaces from a node or workload context. This behavior matches the ModeLeak reconnaissance phase where a compromised Vertex AI custom job used service agent credentials to map cluster resources. Broad cross-namespace enumeration from non-administrative contexts often precedes privilege escalation and lateral access to model artifacts.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1613 — drag to rearrange

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Malicious Kubernetes Reconnaissance Tooling Activity

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Suspicious Kubernetes Secret Enumeration via kubectl

Suspicious Kubernetes API Request From Anonymous User

Suspicious Kubernetes Secret and Permission Enumeration via kubectl (via process_creation)

Suspicious Anonymous Access to Kubernetes API Server via Audit Log

Suspicious Kubernetes Enumeration via kubectl in Cloud Compromise

Pivot detection · T1613 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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