Suspicious Kubernetes Service Account Token Generation via kubectl

PremiumReviewedSigma · Low · v1
Product
linux
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-24
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion → Lateral Movement
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the use of kubectl create token to mint a service account token which attackers abuse after compromising an Amazon EKS node to impersonate service accounts and pivot from the Kubernetes cluster into the connected cloud account.

Related detections9 linkedT1550.001 — drag to rearrange
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Suspicious Google Workspace OAuthLogin From Node.js Client via Tycoon 2FA
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Suspicious Kubernetes Service Account Token Generation via kubectl
Pivot detection · T1550.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.