Suspicious Lancefly TdiProxy Driver Loaded

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
driver_load
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-01
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects loading of a kernel driver named TdiProxy.sys, installed as a service by Lancefly to intercept network traffic and support its Merdoor backdoor. This driver name is not associated with legitimate software.

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Suspicious Lancefly TdiProxy Driver Loaded
Pivot detection · T1543.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.