Suspicious Larva-24009 Keylogger Log Staging in OneDrive Path (via file_event)

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access → Collection

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
- T1056.001Keylogging
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
- T1056.001Keylogging
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the creation of keylogger output files named log.log or logv.log under the ProgramData Microsoft OneDrive directory as observed in the Larva-24009 campaign. The use of an OneDrive named folder under ProgramData for keystroke capture is a strong indicator of this actor.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1056.001 — drag to rearrange

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Possible Andariel Keylogger Output Archive Staged in Temp (via file_event)

Suspicious Parallax RAT Keylogger Output File Creation via File System (via file_event)

Suspicious Larva-24009 Keylogger Log Staging in OneDrive Path (via file_event)

Pivot detection · T1056.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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