Suspicious LaunchAgent or LaunchDaemon Load via launchctl

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1543.001Launch Agent
Priv Esc
- T1543.001Launch Agent
Defense Evasion
- T1647Plist File Modification
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects launchctl loading a property list from a LaunchAgents or LaunchDaemons directory, the persistence mechanism most macOS malware uses to survive reboots. Registering a malicious plist ensures the payload is relaunched automatically by launchd under user or system context.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1543.001 — drag to rearrange

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Suspicious LaunchAgent or LaunchDaemon Load via launchctl

Pivot detection · T1543.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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