huntrule

Suspicious Localized Administrator Account and Group Enumeration After Citrix Bleed Exploitation

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-19
Updated
2026-10-19
AnalysisDetection

ATT&CK techniques

Discovery

  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects net.exe enumeration targeting Spanish-localized privileged account and group names such as administrador and administradores, matching hands-on reconnaissance observed during Citrix Bleed post-exploitation by Unit 42. Attackers map local admin membership to plan privilege escalation which is unusual outside of interactive intrusion.

Reporting behind it

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Possible Logged-On Session Discovery via Quser or Qwinsta (via process_creation)
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Suspicious Group Discovery - PowerShell (via powershell)
Suspicious Localized Administrator Account and Group Enumeration After Citrix Bleed Exploitation
Pivot detection · T1033 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.