Suspicious Logon Script Written to SYSVOL Share via Group Policy (via file_event)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
file_event
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-27
Updated
2026-10-27

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Cred Access

  6. Discovery

  7. Lateral Movement

  8. Collection

  9. C2

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects batch or PowerShell logon scripts being written into the domain controller SYSVOL share, a technique used by a Qilin affiliate to push credential harvesting scripts to every endpoint through Group Policy logon script execution. Attackers stage files such as logon.bat and run.bat under SYSVOL to run malicious code at user logon domain wide.

Related detections9 linkedT1484.001 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Group Policy Client-Side Extension Attribute Modification via Directory Service Change
Suspicious Modification of a Sensitive Group Policy - GPO (via security)
Suspicious Group Policy File System Path Redirection via Directory Service Change
Malicious GPO Permission Abuse via SharpGPOAbuse
Suspicious Executable Launched from SYSVOL Share
Malicious SharpGPOAbuse GPO Modification Tool from Public Directory
Suspicious Permissions Changed on a Group Policy - GPO (via security)
Suspicious Executable Launched from Domain Netlogon Share (via process_creation)
Windows Process: GPME Used to Modify Default Domain and Default Domain Controllers GPOs
Suspicious Logon Script Written to SYSVOL Share via Group Policy (via file_event)
Pivot detection · T1484.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.