Windows: Suspicious LSASS handle access via svchost.exe call trace to seclogon.dll
Flags svchost.exe attempting LSASS access (granted access 0x14c0) with seclogon.dll in the call trace.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- process_access
- Author
- Samir Bousseaden (original elastic rule), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2022-06-29
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
Cred AccessRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
Identifies process access events where svchost.exe requests a specific granted access right to lsass.exe and the call trace includes seclogon.dll. Attackers may use this path to obtain a handle to LSASS in order to access credentials from memory. The rule relies on Windows process access telemetry that provides TargetImage, SourceImage, GrantedAccess, and CallTrace.
Reporting behind it
- twitter.comhttps://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1541920424635912196
- github.comhttps://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/2bc1795f3d7bcc3946452eb4f07ae799a756d94e/rules/windows/credential_access_lsass_handle_via_malseclogon.toml
- splintercod3.blogspot.comhttps://splintercod3.blogspot.com/p/the-hidden-side-of-seclogon-part-3.html
- github.comhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_lsass_seclogon_access.yml
Changelog
v2- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: "Windows: Suspicious LSASS handle access via svchost.exe call trace to seclogon.dll"
id: b1ad0e7c-7195-4444-b4f2-3d8dd80e339c
status: test
description: Identifies process access events where svchost.exe requests a specific granted access right to lsass.exe and the call trace includes seclogon.dll. Attackers may use this path to obtain a handle to LSASS in order to access credentials from memory. The rule relies on Windows process access telemetry that provides TargetImage, SourceImage, GrantedAccess, and CallTrace.
references:
- https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1541920424635912196
- https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/2bc1795f3d7bcc3946452eb4f07ae799a756d94e/rules/windows/credential_access_lsass_handle_via_malseclogon.toml
- https://splintercod3.blogspot.com/p/the-hidden-side-of-seclogon-part-3.html
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_lsass_seclogon_access.yml
author: Samir Bousseaden (original elastic rule), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2022-06-29
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003.001
logsource:
category: process_access
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetImage|endswith: \lsass.exe
SourceImage|endswith: \svchost.exe
GrantedAccess: "0x14c0"
CallTrace|contains: seclogon.dll
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 472159c5-31b9-4f56-b794-b766faa8b0a7
type: derived