Suspicious M365 Password Spraying via Azure PowerShell AppId from Quad7 Botnet

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
azure
Service
signinlogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-25
Updated
2026-10-25

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Execution

  4. Discovery

  5. Lateral Movement

  6. Collection

  7. C2

  8. Exfiltration

  9. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Microsoft 365 sign-in attempts using the Azure PowerShell application id 1950a258-227b-4e31-a9cf-717495945fc2 against the Microsoft Graph resource identity, the combination the Quad7 botnet relies on for distributed password spraying. The operators relay authentication through compromised SOHO routers to validate stolen credentials at scale. Clustering on this AppId and resource surfaces the brute force activity for review.

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Suspicious M365 Password Spraying via Azure PowerShell AppId from Quad7 Botnet
Pivot detection · T1078.004 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.