Suspicious macOS Credential Validation via dscl authonly

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Cred Access

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1059.004Unix Shell
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
- T1555Credentials from Password Stores
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the macOS dscl utility invoked with the authonly option to validate a user password, a credential verification technique used by the AMOS stealer to confirm harvested passwords before privilege escalation. Malware uses dscl authonly to test captured credentials without triggering a login prompt. Scripted authonly checks are atypical of normal user activity.

Reporting behind it

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Suspicious macOS Credential Validation via dscl authonly

Pivot detection · T1059.004 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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