huntrule

Suspicious Mock Trusted Directory with Trailing Space (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-23
Updated
2026-08-28
AnalysisDetection

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → Defense Evasion

  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the DBatLoader UAC bypass technique that creates a mock system directory whose name carries a trailing space before the System32 segment to satisfy trusted-directory checks. Any process image path containing Windows followed by a space and then a backslash indicates this masquerade. Legitimate Windows binaries never execute from such a path.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1548.002 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Banana RAT UAC Skip Environment Variable in PowerShell
Malicious UAC Bypass via sdclt Handler Hijack (via registry_set)
Malicious UAC Bypass via ms-settings Handler Hijack (via registry_set)
Malicious DBatLoader DLL Sideloading via easinvoker.exe Loading netutils.dll (via image_load)
Suspicious dllhost.exe Spawned with CLSID and Anomalous Parent (via process_creation)
Malicious ms-settings DelegateExecute UAC Bypass Registry Change
Malicious User Account Control Bypass via Auto-Elevating Binary Hijack (via process_creation)
Suspicious UAC Bypass via ComputerDefaults Auto-Elevated Binary (via process_creation)
Malicious UAC Bypass via DllHost ICMLuaUtil Elevated COM Interface in ValleyRat Campaign (via process_creation)
Suspicious Mock Trusted Directory with Trailing Space (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1548.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.