Suspicious Modification of CloudFiles BlockedApps Policy via registry_set

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1112Modify Registry
Priv Esc
- T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
Defense Evasion
- T1112Modify Registry
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects writes to the CloudFiles BlockedApps policy key under the default user hive, abused during MiniPlasma privilege escalation through a registry symlink to Volatile Environment. This key is not a normal target for user or application configuration. Tampering here supports the exploit primitive used to elevate privileges.

Reporting behind it

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Suspicious Modification of CloudFiles BlockedApps Policy via registry_set

Pivot detection · T1112 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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