Suspicious Modification of dMSA Managed Account Link Attributes

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1098Account Manipulation
Priv Esc
- T1098Account Manipulation
Defense Evasion
- T1207Rogue Domain Controller
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects directory modifications to the msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink or msDS-DelegatedMSAState attributes of a delegated Managed Service Account. The BadSuccessor attack abuses these dMSA attributes to inherit privileges from a targeted account and escalate in Active Directory. Changes to these attributes outside sanctioned administration indicate an escalation attempt.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1098 — drag to rearrange

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Suspicious Modification of dMSA Managed Account Link Attributes

Pivot detection · T1098 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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