Suspicious more_eggs XSL Transform Execution via msxsl from ProgramData (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-30
Updated
2026-10-30

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the msxsl command-line XSL transformer running from a ProgramData path, the stage-four more_eggs execution technique where a dropped msxsl processed obfuscated payload files. Adversaries abuse msxsl as a trusted utility to execute embedded script outside script-host controls, so its presence under ProgramData rather than a developer toolchain indicates malicious JScript execution.

Related detections6 linkedT1220 — drag to rearrange
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Suspicious msxsl Execution with Text Script Dropper
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Windows msxsl.exe Execution with HTTP Keyword in Command Line
Windows WMIC loading JavaScript/VBScript engine libraries
Windows Msxsl.exe Execution
Suspicious more_eggs XSL Transform Execution via msxsl from ProgramData (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1220 · 6 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.