Suspicious .NET Utility Spawned by AutoHotkey Loader for Process Hollowing (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-25
Updated
2026-09-25

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the AsyncRAT loader hollowing legitimate .NET Framework utilities such as AddInProcess32.exe, AppLaunch.exe and aspnet_compiler.exe launched from the Windows Sound Diagnostics staging folder. These binaries are injected with the final remote access trojan. A parent located in that package path spawning these utilities indicates hollowing.

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Pivot detection · T1055.012 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.