Suspicious NetSupport Client Execution via Scheduled Task

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-28
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Defense Evasion

  5. Cred Access

  6. Discovery

  7. Lateral Movement

  8. Collection

  9. Exfiltration

  10. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of the NetSupport remote control client client32.exe spawned by the Windows task scheduler, observed in a Huntress ClickFix CastleLoader campaign that established persistence through a scheduled task. NetSupport is frequently abused as a covert remote access tool after loader execution. Launch of client32.exe from the scheduler service indicates attacker-installed remote access persistence.

Related detections9 linkedT1053.005 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious MeshAgent Persistence via Scheduled Task MeshUserTask (via process_creation)
Suspicious Scheduled Task Running PowerShell Every Minute (via process_creation)
Agent Tesla Persistence via Realtek Named Scheduled Task Batch
Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation Named test3 by Salt Typhoon
Suspicious BeyondTrust Bomgar Process Spawning Remote Access Client (via process_creation)
Suspicious RustDesk Remote Access Service Installation via sc (via process_creation)
Suspicious PowerShell Spawned by VBScript for RMM Delivery
Malicious PureMiner Persistence Executable in AppData HResult Folder
Suspicious Kimsuky Scheduled Task Impersonating Google Update CGI (via process_creation)
Suspicious NetSupport Client Execution via Scheduled Task
Pivot detection · T1053.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.