Suspicious NetSupport Client Execution via Scheduled Task

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-28
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Defense Evasion

  5. Cred Access

  6. Discovery

  7. Lateral Movement

  8. Collection

  9. Exfiltration

  10. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of the NetSupport remote control client client32.exe spawned by the Windows task scheduler, observed in a Huntress ClickFix CastleLoader campaign that established persistence through a scheduled task. NetSupport is frequently abused as a covert remote access tool after loader execution. Launch of client32.exe from the scheduler service indicates attacker-installed remote access persistence.

Related detections9 linkedT1219 — drag to rearrange
Malicious Scheduled Task Masquerading as GoogleUpdate Launching SSH Reverse Shell
Suspicious MeshAgent Persistence via Scheduled Task MeshUserTask (via process_creation)
Suspicious ScreenConnect Remote Access Binary Running Under a Renamed Executable
Malicious Silent AteraAgent RMM Installation via IntegratorLogin
Possible Remote Monitoring and Management Tool Abuse for Remote Access
Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation Referencing dllFake Batch Scripts (via process_creation)
Suspicious NetSupport Manager Client Executing From ProgramData via Process Creation (via process_creation)
Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation With WebDAV Loader Task Names (via process_creation)
Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation with ClickFix Update Recon Name (via process_creation)
Suspicious NetSupport Client Execution via Scheduled Task
Pivot detection · T1219 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.