Suspicious NetSupport client32 Execution from AppData

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-14
Updated
2026-09-14

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the NetSupport client binary client32.exe executing from an AppData directory, the location where the ClickFix campaign deployed NetSupport as a RAT. Although NetSupport is legitimate remote-control software, execution from a user profile directory indicates abuse for unauthorized remote access.

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Suspicious NetSupport client32 Execution from AppData
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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.