Suspicious NetSupport client32 Execution from User Writable Path

ATT&CK techniques

C2

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
- T1219Remote Access Tools
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the NetSupport Manager client32.exe running from a user writable directory such as AppData, Temp or ProgramData, the deployment pattern used by SmartApeSG to run NetSupport RAT for remote control. Legitimate NetSupport installs live under Program Files, so execution from a staging folder indicates malicious remote access tooling.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1219 — drag to rearrange

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Suspicious NetSupport client32 Persistence via Run Key from ProgramData

Suspicious Atera Agent Silent Onboarding via Process Creation

Suspicious Remote Access Tool User Agent in Outbound Traffic via Proxy

Suspicious ScreenConnect Remote Access Binary Running Under a Renamed Executable

Suspicious NetSupport client32 Execution from User Writable Path

Pivot detection · T1219 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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