Suspicious NetSupport Manager Client Executing From ProgramData via Process Creation (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-23
Updated
2026-10-23

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the NetSupport Manager client (client32.exe) running from the ProgramData directory, the remote access tool abused as a RAT in campaigns delivering malware through MSIX installers per Red Canary. Legitimate NetSupport deployments live under Program Files, so execution from ProgramData indicates an attacker-installed remote access foothold.

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Suspicious NetSupport Manager Client Executing From ProgramData via Process Creation (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1219 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.