Suspicious Network Provider Registration for Credential Interception via NPPSpy

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
registry_set
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-03
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Discovery

  7. Lateral Movement

  8. Collection

  9. C2

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the registration of a network provider ProviderPath value under the service control set, the mechanism NPPSpy uses to capture plaintext logon credentials during interactive sign-in as seen in Operation Diplomatic Specter. A rogue network provider silently harvests domain credentials as users authenticate. Detecting this registration exposes credential-access tradecraft on the host.

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Suspicious Network Provider Registration for Credential Interception via NPPSpy
Pivot detection · T1003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.