Suspicious Non-Standard HTTP Methods Used for Covert C2 (via proxy)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
proxy
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-21
Updated
2026-10-21

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects HTTP requests using the non-standard verbs POT, DPF, UPF, CPF, and LPF employed by malware in a suspected China-based espionage operation to encode command and control operations. These invalid HTTP methods are not produced by legitimate clients, so their presence marks covert C2 signaling.

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Suspicious Non-Standard HTTP Methods Used for Covert C2 (via proxy)
Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.