Suspicious NTLM Network Logon From Attacker Controlled Workstation Names (via security)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1

Product: windows
Service: security
Author: HuntRule
Published: 2026-10-23
Updated: 2026-10-23

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Cred Access

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
- T1078Valid Accounts
Execution
Persistence
- T1078Valid Accounts
- T1556Modify Authentication Process
Priv Esc
- T1078Valid Accounts
Defense Evasion
- T1078Valid Accounts
- T1556Modify Authentication Process
Cred Access
- T1556Modify Authentication Process
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects successful NTLM network logons (Event 4624, logon type 3) originating from the workstation names DESKTOP-KRLUI3J and KALI. Rapid7 observed these workstation names during active exploitation of the SonicWall SMA1000 zero days CVE-2026-15409 and CVE-2026-15410 where the actor pivoted from the compromised appliance into the internal network. Kali-branded and attacker-named hosts authenticating over NTLM indicate lateral movement using stolen or bypassed credentials.

Reporting behind it

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Suspicious NTLM Network Logon From Attacker Controlled Workstation Names (via security)

Pivot detection · T1078 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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