Suspicious OAuth Application Consent Grant via Azure Audit Logs

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
azure
Service
auditlogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-23
Updated
2026-10-23

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Execution

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects user or admin consent granted to an OAuth application in Entra ID, the pivot point in illicit consent phishing campaigns where victims authorize attacker-controlled apps requesting sensitive Graph permissions. Adversaries use consented apps to read mail and files and to establish durable API access that survives password resets, so unexpected consent events warrant review.

Related detections9 linkedT1528 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious M365 Device Code Authentication Flow via m365
Suspicious Entra Device Code Authentication with Office Client and Automated User Agent
Suspicious OWA Proxy User-Agent Indicating Mailbox Access
Suspicious Anonymous Sharing Link Creation in SharePoint or OneDrive via M365 Audit
Suspicious OAuth Application Consent Granted High Privilege Mail Scopes (via m365)
Suspicious Token Request Using Microsoft Authentication Broker Client to Obtain Primary Refresh Token (via azure)
Suspicious Salesforce Connected App OAuth Authorization from VPN Egress
Suspicious Screensaver File Executed as Installer via process_creation
Possible Illicit Consent Grant to OAuth Application via Azure AD
Suspicious OAuth Application Consent Grant via Azure Audit Logs
Pivot detection · T1528 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.