Suspicious OAuth Consent Grant to Mail Access Permissions via Azure AD

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
azure
Service
auditlogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-09
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Lateral Movement
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Cred Access

  6. Discovery

  7. Collection

  8. C2

  9. Exfiltration

  10. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects OAuth application consent grants that request mailbox read/send and offline access scopes in Azure AD audit logs. This aligns with the Huntress traitorware campaign where adversaries consent legitimate mail clients to gain persistent mailbox access, letting them read and send mail via issued tokens without touching the password.

Related detections9 linkedT1550.001 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Federated Identity Credential On-Behalf-Of Token Flow via Sign-In Logs
Suspicious Entra ID Application Consent Failure Indicating Unauthorized OAuth Grant Attempt (via azure)
Malicious Business Email Compromise OAuth Application Sign-In via Entra ID Service Principal (via azure)
Suspicious Salesforce Bulk API Export via aiohttp User Agent
Suspicious ApplicationImpersonation Role Assigned to Mailbox Principal (via m365)
Suspicious Entra Sign-In With Axios Automation User-Agent via AiTM Token Replay (via azure)
Malicious Azure AD Token Abuse via Roadtx
Suspicious M365 Sign-In from Synthetic iPhone User Agent via m365
Possible Illicit Consent Grant to OAuth Application via Azure AD
Suspicious OAuth Consent Grant to Mail Access Permissions via Azure AD
Pivot detection · T1550.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.