Suspicious OAuth Consent Grant to Mail Access Permissions via Azure AD
- Product
- azure
- Service
- auditlogs
- Author
- HuntRule
- Published
- 2026-05-09
- Updated
- 2026-08-28
ATT&CK techniques
Persistence → Lateral MovementRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule detects OAuth application consent grants that request mailbox read/send and offline access scopes in Azure AD audit logs. This aligns with the Huntress traitorware campaign where adversaries consent legitimate mail clients to gain persistent mailbox access, letting them read and send mail via issued tokens without touching the password.
Reporting behind it
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
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