Suspicious Object Access to DPAPI Machine Keys and System Protect Directories (via security)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Service
security
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-09
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects object access audit events for the DPAPI MachineKeys and the System (S-1-5-18) Protect directories by processes other than core system services, matching the file access seen while recovering active ADFS signing keys via machine DPAPI. Adversaries read these locations to obtain machine masterkeys and protected private keys, so unexpected access here indicates credential theft from key stores.

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Suspicious Object Access to DPAPI Machine Keys and System Protect Directories (via security)
Pivot detection · T1552.004 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.