Suspicious Outbound Connection From CasPol Binary

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
network_connection
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-06
Updated
2026-09-06

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion → C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the .NET CasPol.exe binary establishing outbound network connections, behavior consistent with the XWorm LATAM campaign hollowing CasPol to beacon to its C2. CasPol has no legitimate need for network communication.

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Suspicious Outbound Connection From CasPol Binary
Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.