Suspicious Payload Download from Transfer.sh After ScreenConnect Exploitation (via proxy)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
proxy
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-21
Updated
2026-10-21

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects outbound HTTP requests to the transfer.sh file sharing service, an abused staging host from which ScreenConnect exploitation actors retrieve malicious installers and second stage tooling. Enterprise endpoints rarely fetch payloads from transfer.sh, so traffic to this service following suspected exploitation is a useful ingress tool transfer indicator.

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Suspicious Payload Download from Transfer.sh After ScreenConnect Exploitation (via proxy)
Pivot detection · T1105 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.