Suspicious PlushDaemon EdgeStepper Configuration File Creation

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
linux
Category
file_event
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-23
Updated
2026-09-23

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of the EdgeStepper configuration file bioset.conf under etc, the encrypted settings store dropped by PlushDaemon on compromised routers. The filename masquerades as a legitimate system component while holding the AES-CBC keyed C2 configuration, so its appearance indicates implant deployment.

Related detections9 linkedT1105 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious BeaverTail C2 Download over Non-Standard Port 1224 (via proxy)
Suspicious Telegraph-Hosted Encrypted Payload Retrieval (via proxy)
Suspicious ClickFix PowerShell Download Cradle via TAG-150 Tradecraft
Malicious PowerShell Download of FortiEndpoint Patch Masquerade via EKZ Stealer
Malicious PowerShell StreamReader WebRequest Download Cradle
Suspicious PowerShell Download Cradle via Net.WebClient DownloadFile
Suspicious Pastebin Raw Content Retrieval via curl (via process_creation)
Suspicious Curl Download of DAT Payload Followed by Rundll32 Execution
Suspicious PowerShell Remote Download of PhantomPulse Stager
Suspicious PlushDaemon EdgeStepper Configuration File Creation
Pivot detection · T1105 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.