Suspicious PowerShell Execution Bypass Running Script From ProgramData

ATT&CK techniques

Execution

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1059.001PowerShell
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects PowerShell launched with an execution policy bypass to run a script stored in C\ProgramData, matching the ToddyCat loader that executed c\programdata\ip445.ps1. Staging scripts in the world-accessible ProgramData directory and bypassing execution policy is a common tradecraft for running attacker tooling with minimal friction. The combination is unusual for legitimate administrative scripts.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1059.001 — drag to rearrange

Suspicious cmd.exe Launching Encoded PowerShell From Shortcut File

Suspicious Cursor Editor Process Spawning PowerShell

Suspicious PowerShell Base64 Encoded Staged Downloader via process_creation

Suspicious GitVenom Visual Studio Pre-Build Event Shell Execution via process_creation

Malicious PowerShell UrlDecode Payload Spawned by SQL Server after FortiClient EMS Exploitation

Suspicious PowerShell Version Pinning with Encoded Command

Suspicious Encoded PowerShell Spawned from Explorer via ClickFix

Suspicious MeshAgent Masquerading as NetworkDrivers Spawned by PowerShell

PowerShell ExportedCommands Array Index for Indirect Cmdlet Execution (Windows Process Creation)

Suspicious PowerShell Execution Bypass Running Script From ProgramData

Pivot detection · T1059.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

Full detection rule

Unlock this rule to view and copy it

The detection logic is included with a plan. Everything else — context, mappings and implementation details — stays free on this page.

Sign in for 3 free unlocks

Signing in gives you 3 unlocks to spend on any rule in the library. No card, and they do not expire.

Also included

Unlocked rules convert on this page — to Splunk SPL or Splunk — Raw Index SPL or Microsoft Sentinel KQL or Microsoft Sentinel ASIM ASIM KQL or Microsoft Defender XDR KQL or Elastic Security KQL or Elastic Security Lucene or Elastic Security ES|QL or CrowdStrike Falcon CQL or SentinelOne PowerQuery or Palo Alto Cortex XDR XQL or Carbon Black Cloud Platform Search or Carbon Black EDR Process Search or Google Security Operations UDM Search or IBM QRadar AQL or Sumo Logic Cloud SIEM Rules expression or Rapid7 InsightIDR LEQL or Graylog Search or OpenSearch Lucene or OpenSearch PPL PPL or Grafana Loki LogQL or SQLite SQL or Zircolite SQLite — with the log-source profile the engine picked, the field map it used, and everything it could not express. Converting a rule you have unlocked costs no further credit.

See it run on a free rule →Convert your own rule →