Suspicious PowerShell Interaction with ProgramData SysInt Log via Process Creation

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-15
Updated
2026-09-15

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects PowerShell reading or writing the C ProgramData SysInt.log file that MuddyWater's DarkBeatC2 uses as a staging and command buffer in its multi-stage poll loop. The specific ProgramData filename combined with PowerShell indicates the DarkBeatC2 implant rather than legitimate logging.

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Suspicious PowerShell Interaction with ProgramData SysInt Log via Process Creation
Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.