Suspicious PowerShell Spawned by Komari Monitoring Agent

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-01
Updated
2026-10-01

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the komari-agent binary spawning PowerShell, the built-in reverse shell behavior of the Komari monitoring tool abused in a Huntress-investigated intrusion. The agent was installed as a NSSM service masquerading as Windows Update Service and used its embedded shell for command execution. A monitoring agent launching an interactive interpreter reflects abuse of its reverse shell capability.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.