Suspicious PowerShell Spawned by ScreenConnect Remote Access Client

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-30
Updated
2026-09-30

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects PowerShell being launched as a child of the ScreenConnect remote access client, a lineage observed where actors abused legitimate RMM tooling to run follow-on scripts. While ScreenConnect is widely used for support, a scripting host spawned from its agent is a frequent hands-on-keyboard delivery pattern and merits scrutiny in environments where it is not sanctioned. Correlate with the downstream script content to confirm intent.

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Suspicious PowerShell Spawned by ScreenConnect Remote Access Client
Pivot detection · T1059.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.