Suspicious PowerShell Spawned by ScreenConnect Remote Access Client

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → C2

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1059.001PowerShell
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
- T1219Remote Access Tools
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects PowerShell being launched as a child of the ScreenConnect remote access client, a lineage observed where actors abused legitimate RMM tooling to run follow-on scripts. While ScreenConnect is widely used for support, a scripting host spawned from its agent is a frequent hands-on-keyboard delivery pattern and merits scrutiny in environments where it is not sanctioned. Correlate with the downstream script content to confirm intent.

Reporting behind it

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Pivot detection · T1219 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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