Suspicious PowerShell WebClient Download of Executable Payload

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-30
Updated
2026-10-30

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects PowerShell instantiating a dotnet WebClient object and invoking DownloadFile to retrieve a payload which the Dagon Locker intrusion used to pull a follow on DLL from a public file sharing host and this matters because the WebClient DownloadFile pattern is a widely abused fileless download primitive that fetches second stage tooling onto the host.

Related detections9 linkedT1059.001 — drag to rearrange
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Suspicious Hidden PowerShell WebClient DownloadFile Cradle
Suspicious PowerShell Download Cradle with Spoofed User-Agent via MSIX
Malicious PowerShell In-Memory Download Cradle via Script Block (via ps_script)
Suspicious node.exe Execution Spawned by PowerShell
Suspicious PowerShell Download Cradle via IEX and DownloadString (via process_creation)
Suspicious PowerShell Download to Temp and In-Memory Execution via IEX (via process_creation)
Suspicious PowerShell WebClient Download of Executable Payload
Pivot detection · T1059.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.