Suspicious PowerShell/WScript Activity in WMI Event Consumer Commands
Identifies WMI event consumer commands containing PowerShell/WScript download-and-execute patterns like Net.WebClient and IEX.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- wmi_event
- Author
- Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jonhnathan Ribeiro (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2019-04-15
- Updated
- 2026-07-30
ATT&CK techniques
ExecutionRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule flags WMI event consumer command lines that reference scripting and download execution patterns, including PowerShell-style use of New-Object with Net.WebClient and DownloadString/DownloadFile, as well as common IEX/encoding and base64-related constructs. Such activity is relevant because WMI event subscriptions can be abused to run attacker-supplied scripts persistently or at scheduled triggers. It relies on telemetry from Windows WMI event logs that record the consumer Destination command text.
Reporting behind it
- in.securityhttps://in.security/an-intro-into-abusing-and-identifying-wmi-event-subscriptions-for-persistence/
- github.comhttps://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/615bf1f6bac3c1bdc417025c40c073e6c2771a76/yara/gen_susp_lnk_files.yar#L19
- github.comhttps://github.com/RiccardoAncarani/LiquidSnake
- github.comhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/wmi_event/sysmon_wmi_susp_scripting.yml
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: Suspicious PowerShell/WScript Activity in WMI Event Consumer Commands
id: 1eae6e9a-c15a-4550-ac01-8239bfdddd9d
status: test
description: This rule flags WMI event consumer command lines that reference scripting and download execution patterns, including PowerShell-style use of New-Object with Net.WebClient and DownloadString/DownloadFile, as well as common IEX/encoding and base64-related constructs. Such activity is relevant because WMI event subscriptions can be abused to run attacker-supplied scripts persistently or at scheduled triggers. It relies on telemetry from Windows WMI event logs that record the consumer Destination command text.
references:
- https://in.security/an-intro-into-abusing-and-identifying-wmi-event-subscriptions-for-persistence/
- https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/615bf1f6bac3c1bdc417025c40c073e6c2771a76/yara/gen_susp_lnk_files.yar#L19
- https://github.com/RiccardoAncarani/LiquidSnake
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/wmi_event/sysmon_wmi_susp_scripting.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Huntrule Team
date: 2019-04-15
modified: 2023-09-09
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.005
logsource:
product: windows
category: wmi_event
detection:
selection_destination:
- Destination|contains|all:
- new-object
- net.webclient
- .downloadstring
- Destination|contains|all:
- new-object
- net.webclient
- .downloadfile
- Destination|contains:
- " iex("
- " -nop "
- " -noprofile "
- " -decode "
- " -enc "
- WScript.Shell
- System.Security.Cryptography.FromBase64Transform
condition: selection_destination
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative scripts
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: fe21810c-2a8c-478f-8dd3-5a287fb2a0e0
type: derived