Suspicious Process Memory Secret Dump via proc mem

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
- T1552.001Credentials In Files
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a process reading another process address space through the proc mem interface, the credential harvesting technique used by the Shai-Hulud framework to scrape secrets from memory. The malware walks proc pid mem to lift tokens and keys that never touch disk. Direct reads of proc mem outside of debuggers are rare and indicate in-memory secret theft.

Reporting behind it

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Suspicious Process Memory Secret Dump via proc mem

Pivot detection · T1552.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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