Suspicious Python Interpreter Execution From Downloads Directory via PureHVNC Loader (via process_creation)

ATT&CK techniques

Execution

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1059.006Python
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the PureHVNC loader which extracts a portable Python environment into a hidden folder under the user Downloads directory and runs Python files carrying RC4 encrypted shellcode. A Python interpreter executing scripts from Downloads is unusual on endpoints. This stage decrypts and runs shellcode.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1059.006 — drag to rearrange

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Suspicious Python Interpreter Execution From Downloads Directory via PureHVNC Loader (via process_creation)

Pivot detection · T1059.006 · 9 related

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