Suspicious Python or uv Execution Spawned by AI CLI Assistant

PremiumReviewedSigma · Low · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-18
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Execution
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the python or uv interpreter launched as a child of an AI command line assistant such as the Claude or Gemini CLI which reflects adversaries directing these agents to run local code during hands on abuse. Because AI CLI tools can execute arbitrary commands on behalf of a user they can be steered into running attacker supplied scripts. Detecting unexpected interpreter children of AI assistants supports hunting for this emerging abuse.

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Pivot detection · T1059 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.