Suspicious Python-Requests Exfiltration to Webhook.site (s1ngularity Aftermath)

ATT&CK techniques

Exfiltration

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
- T1567Exfiltration Over Web Service
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects an outbound request with a python-requests user agent to the webhook.site service, the exfiltration channel observed in the s1ngularity aftermath for stolen inventory data. It matters because a scripted client posting to a public request capture endpoint is a common credential exfiltration route from developer machines.

Reporting behind it

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Suspicious Python-Requests Exfiltration to Webhook.site (s1ngularity Aftermath)

Pivot detection · T1567 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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